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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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-

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

~/(93-8-S-

COX, JEFFERY J. and ELLIOTT J.
a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J.
COX, JEFFERY J. COX, YVONNE
COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED
STATES OF ~RICA, TRACY-COLLINS
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF
EPHRAIM,
Defendant-Respondents.

--

~

- --- - -- -

-----

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS COX
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-Respondents Cox do not agree with the
statement of facts set forth in the brief of PlaintiffAppellant and therefore, set forth the following statement
of facts.
Utah Farm Production Credit Association (hereinafter
PCA) finances the turkey business of certain turkey growers in
Sanpete County (Findings of Fact 15).

At the times relevant

hereto Jeffery J. Cox was in the business of raising turkeys
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in Sanpete county, Utah, and was one of the growers financed
by PCA.
In. February of 1973, Jeff Cox (hereinafter Cox)
opened a line of credit with PCA which continued through
· 1975 (Tr. 25, 329).

During this period his indebtedness

increased, and each year PCA renewed his loan for a year and
financed his operation for the following year (Tr. 4 7) .

Jeffe

Cox and his wife Yvonne signed promissory notes and security
agreements in favor of PCA as did his parents Elliott and
Blanche Cox.

In the fall of 1976 Jeff Cox evaluated his debt

with PCA and decided to withdraw from the turkey growing
business and put his farm and "retains

11

from Moroni

Feed Company up for sale to pay off his. debt with PCA.
When Cox informed PCA of his intent to get out of
the business of raising turkeys, PCA felt that it was undercollateralized on its loan to Cox (Tr. 216-220, 247-250).
an attempt to improve

its

security margin

In

s tephen L. Adamson,

a PCA loan officer, met with Jeff Cox on January 17, 1977.
At this meeting, Adamson said PCA would be willing to finance
Cox' turkey business for another year ( 1977) if Cox would agree
to pledge his stock in Moroni Coal Company as security (Findings of Fact 17).

Cox agreed, but stated that his father who

held a controlling interest in the coal company would not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pledge his stock.

Adamson authorized Cox to purchase 60,000

turkey poults and released Cox' 1977 "retains" (dividends payable from Moroni Feed Company and which were covered by a
security agreement in favor of PCA) toward the delivery of the
first 20,000 poults (Findings of Fact 17, 19).

Also, based

on PCA's loan commitment, Cox took his farm and Moroni Feed
Company dividends off the market (Findings of Fact 19).
PCA's course of dealing and performance was such
that Adamson had apparent and express authority to make a loan
cormnitment to Cox (Findings of Fact 16, 18; Tr. 118).
At a second meeting, approximately one week later,
Cox delivered his Moroni Coal Company Stock to PCA and Adamson
drafted a budget with Cox covering operating expenses for
the year (Tr. 96, Defs'.

Exh. 30).

It was agreed that these

expenses were to be covered by a loan that would be due one
year from the day the promissory note was to be signed (Tr. 271
A, 127, 128).

The possibility of obtaining a government

guaranteed loan covering the outstanding debt to date was
also discussed (Tr. 271 and 271A).

Government guaranteed

loans had not been available in the past (Tr. 170-171).
On February 12, 1977, Cox took delivery of the first
20,000 turkeys (Tr. 98).

Cox repeatedly called PCA about

receiving the loan proceeds and was repeatedly put off (Tr.
100, 101).

Finally, at PCA's suggestion, Cox took out a per-

sonal loan with the Bank of Ephraim for $2,500 to pay some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of his current turkey expenses (Tr. 101, 102).

He still

owed Moroni Feed Company about $34,000 for turkey poults and
feed (Tr. 106).
Approximately seven weeks following the delivery
of the first brood of turkeys, PCA again met with Defendants
(Tr. 104).

At this meeting PCA added a new demand requiring

that in addition to Jeff Cox' stock, Elliot Cox' stock in
Moroni Coal Company would also be. required as additional
collateral on the loan {Tr. 102-106, 254, 258).

As he had

done in the past, Elliot Cox refused; whereupon PCA retracted
their conunitment on the loan and said it would immediately
foreclose on Defendant's security including the turkey farm
(Findings of Fact 21 Tr. 105).

Having no way to forestall the

imminent foreclosure action, Cox sold the 20,000 turkeys and
went to work as a truck driver at Moroni Coal Company {Findings
of Fact 22, Tr. 138-140).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of PCA with an offset representing
Cox' loss of profits suffered from the recision of PCA's loan
commitment {Tr. 332) •

In computing the amount of the offset

the court considered the average profit per pound made by
growers participating in the Moroni Feed Company cooperative
program which was four cents per pound for the year 1977.
(Tr. 199-200).

The final production poundage of Cox' first

brood of 20,000 turkeys {which had been sold to one of the
Moroni Feed Company growers) was 321,560 Pounds (Tr. 191).
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The court tripled this poundage

0

-sturkeys which would have been raised and at four cents a pound
found Cox' profit to be $38,587.20.
"retains

11

The court then added

at six cents a pound which were to be retained by

the cooperative and paid in five years and reduced this figure

to present value -- ($28,940.40) to find a gross lost profit
figure of $57,527.60.

From this figure the court subtracted

certain sums for expenses which were saved by Cox because he
was out of the turkey business and the wages Jeff Cox was able
to earn as a truck driver to find a net lost profit total of
$40,927.60.

Finally, the Court added $4,000.00 as an offset

against the interest Cox had been charged by PCA on the $40,927 .60
which PCA was not entitled to recover and found Cox' total offset
to be $44,927.60 (Findings of Fact 23-28, Tr. 330-332).
A profit of four cents per pound was conservative
because the evidence showed that for the type of turkeys Cox
had the profit would have probably been greater (Tr. 202, 204).
Moreover, it was shown that to use the first 20,000 brood of
turkeys to estimate the poundage for the entire year was also
conservative because the first brood is the least productive
(Tr. 327).

The trial court reduced the offset by the amount

Cox made as a truck driver after the turkeys had been sold
(Tr. 331).

This was conservative because in past years he

had been paid nearly the same amount by the coal company
while spending nearly full time with the turkey operation.
(Tr.

141) .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
DEFENDANTS PROPERLY MITIGATED THEIR
DAMAGES
PCA relies upon the general rule of determining
damages for a breach of contract to lend money, i.e., the
difference between the cost of borrowing money from the Defendant as opposed to the cost from an alternative source.

Appel-

lant has conceded, however, that the rule is not absolute (Appt'
Brief, 7).

Virtually all the authorities recognize the need

for an alternate form of damages when the borrower is unable
to mitigate by obtaining alternative financing and suffers
unavoidable harm.

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §343

(1932); Williston On Contracts §1411, at 614 (1968); 22 Am.Jur.
2d Damages

§69 (1965).

awarded special damages.

In such situations the courts have
~Bank

of New Mexico v. Rice, 78

N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967); Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58,
120 P.2d 611 (1941); 36 A.L.R. 1409 at 1414-1426.
For example in Cox Corp. v. Dugger,

583 P.2d 96

(Ut. 1978)!/ plaintiff sought damages for breach of an oral
contract to lend money.

The trial court awarded plaintiff

damages in the amount of the promised loan.

In reversing the

lower court on other grounds the Court stated that damages, if
allowable, would not be the amount of the loan as granted by
the trial court but rather "the difference between the reasonable value of the property and the amount of money required
l/There is no connection between the parties or events in Co~
Corp. v. Dugger and the parties o::

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to be paid by the option contract."
at 96.

Cox v. Dugger, supra,

In Cox Corp. v. Dugger, Justice Maughan dissented,

stating that the trial court should not be reversed.
Nevertheless he agreed with the majority as to the measure
of damages:
.•. where the borrower is unable to obtain money
elsewhere, and the defendant knew of the particular purpose for which the money was needed,
special damages may be recovered, provided they
are not speculative or remote. Cox, supra at
100.

-

It is apparent from Cox that Utah Follows the rule
to the effect that if the borrower is unable to obtain alternative financing, if the lender knew of the purpose for which
the money was being borrowed, and the damages are not speculative or remote, special damages may be awarded.

Defendants

Cox have met all of these criteria in the instant case.
A.

Defendants Cox were unable to borrow money
elsewhere.

The evidence disclosed there were two sources of
financing available to finance current turkey raising operations in the Moroni area.

Moroni Feed Company and PCA.

Appellant briefly argues that Cox made no effort to obtain
alternate financing even though he could have received financing from the Moroni Feed Company for 1977."
7) .

(Appt' s Brief,

In so arguing, Appellant ignores certain facts central

to Cox' decision to sell the initial 20,000 turkey poults and
arrange not to take deli very of the remaining 4 0, 0 0 0 .

At
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the time PCA refused to honor its commitment to finance the
raising of 60,000 poults, Defendants Cox owed over $150,000.oo
for past years.

At the meeting where PCA announced that it

would not honor its loan commitment, Jeff and Elliott Cox
were told that PCA would take immediate steps to foreclose
on the Cox properties (Tr. 105).
Cox' turkey farm.

Among these properties was

Cox understood the futility of trying to

finance the 1977 turkey operation through Moroni Feed Company
if there was no place to raise them.

In fact·, Cox testified

of an offer by Moroni Feed Company to finance the 1977 operatic
following PCA's breach.

But Cox replied:

Well that'd be fine by me but Utah Farm Production, Vaughn Mills said he would be down here
with his foreclosure in a week and-a-half and
I'll have no place to run them [the turkeys] .
... I don't have any alternative but to get rid
of them.
(Tr. 106) •
Following PCA' s announcement that it would immediate
foreclose, Cox was fortunate enough to find a third person to
purchase the 20,000 turkeys and obtain a release on his commit
ment to take 40, 000 more turkey poul ts thereby minimizing his
damages.

If he had waited for alternate financing on the

delinquent past due balance for even a week these arrangements
may not have been possible.

Moreover, the reason PCA was

foreclosing was due to Cox' difficult financial situation.
It is doubtful, therefore, that such a delay would have been
justified in light of poor prospects in obtaining such a large
loan.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PCA's threat to Cox of immediate foreclosure made
it foolhardy to remain in the turkey business having incurred
the expense of 20,000 poults and an obligation to take 40,000
more.

The total budget for the 1977 operation had been

estimated at $368,000.00 (Exh. 30, page 1).

Because Cox had

already incurred approximately $34,000.00 of indebtedness to
Moroni Feed Company, by selling out when he did, Cox reduced
his his potential damages by this amount plus any additional
amounts incurred for additional feed and poults.

PCA's only

suggestion was to let the poults die (Tr. 105).
B.

PCA knew of th~ purpose of the 1977 Cox financing
and the damages could have been contemplated.

The second requirement for an award of lost profits
in the case of a breach of a loan commitment is that the
breaching party "must know of the particular purpose for which
the money was needed."

Cox Corp. v. Dugger, supra at 100.

See also, Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d
620 (Utah 1979).

Obviously the parties herein knew of the

particular purposes for which the money was needed (Tr. 93-100,
225-22 7) .
Both parties contemplated the expectation of a profit
in Cox's operation in at least the amount of the damages awarded
by the lower court.

Appellant argues that PCA expected Cox to

only break even - -

that no profit was expected at all during

1977 (Appt' s Brief, 11) .

In fact, PCA and Cox did sit down

and together calculate Cox' expected profits for 1977 during
the January
7,S.J. Quinney
1977Lawmeeting
• ofIn
that
meeting,
Sponsored by the
Library. Funding for(T'r.
digitization224-227)
provided by the Institute
Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Steve Adamson for PCA filled out a form detailing estimated
operat±on expenses and a second form detaili?g the estimated
gross profit from Cox' operation (Defs' Exh. 30, pp. 1 and 4).
Expenses were estimated at $368,100 and gross profits at
$471,648 -- a difference or net profit of $103,548.

PCA's position that no profit was expected is
apparently based upon Mr. Adamson's testimony at at a later
date he privately figured a separate more conservative estimate
that greatly reduced Cox' expected profits (Tr. 227, Defs'
Exh. 30, p. 15).
private estimate

However, this was a secondary, unofficial,
~

by both parties.

one obviously not shared, or even known,

Regardless of what Adamson thought later, PCA

cannot claim that it did not contemplate that Cox would make
a profit with the help of its financing.
Moreover, the very nature of the turkey industry
and PCA's business is based on a,contemplation of profits by
both parties.

The turkey industry is cyclical (Tr. 157).

The

two or three years prior to 1977 had been bad years for turkey
growers (Tr. 219).
(Tr. 219).
the

PCA was financing many of these growers

It is clear that lending institutions are not in

business of foreclosing their client' s property, but rather

they expect their client will be ultimately successful in his
venture and be able to repay the loan principal with interest.
This is the essence of PCA's dealings with Cox.

Cox accepted

the opportunity offered by PCA to go another year with the turke
business -- both parties expecting the next year to be profitabl
Thus the possibility of profits were necessarily in the contem-
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plation of both parties.

C.

The contemplated lost profits are neither speculative

::>r remote.
Lost profits are a recognized measure of damages in Utah.
insness v. Conoco Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979);
:ox Corp. v. Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah 1978); Howarth v. Ostergaard,
)Q Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442
~elephone

(1973); Gould v. Mountain States

and Telegraph Co., 6 U.2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 (1957).

Cn Winsness v. Conoco Distributors, Inc., supra, for example,

the Utah Supreme Court expressed its acceptance of lost profits
as a measure of damages as follows:
In this case, the evidence as to damages is not so meager
as to invite sheer speculation; imprecise it is, but counsels'
arguments, the court's instructions, and the common sense
of the jury will, no doubt, place the evidence in perspective
for proper resolution of the damage issue. 593 P.2d at 1306.
In explanation, the court in Winsness cited Professor Corbin's

.!discussion on this point as consistent with Utah law .
. . . There is little that can be regarded as "certain,"
especially with respect to what would have happened if the
march of events had been other than it in fact has been.
Neither court nor jury is required to attain "certainty" in
awarding damages; and this is just as true with respect to
"value" as with respect to "Profits." Therefore, the term
"speculative and uncertain profits" is not really a
classification of profits, but is instead a characterization
of the evidence that is introduced to prove that they would
have been made if the defendant had not committed a breach
of contract. The law requires that this evidence shall not
be so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis
for inference, leaving the damages to be determined by
sympathy and feelings alone. The amount of evidence required
and the degree of its strength as a basis of inference varies
with circumstances. A greater amount and a higher degree
are required in those cases in which it is usually possible
to produce it than in cases where it is usually impossible
or difficult and the defendant had reason to know it . . . .
Winsness, supra, at 1306, citing Corbin on Contracts, Vol.
5, §1022.
In Utah, therefore, a plaintiff who has proved liability
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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should be compensated so long as the evidence of his damage is
not so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis for
inference.

Moreover, on appeal this Court should give great

weight to the lower court's findings concerning lost profits.
See Mont.er v. Kratzner' s Specialty Bread Company, 29 Utah 2d 18,
504 P.2d 40 (1972); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360
P.2d 176 (1961).
The trial court in this case found the evidence to
be sufficient.

Respondents Cox submit that the evidence is

sufficient to support the findings and conclusions below to the
effect that Cox would have raised 60,000 turkeys and made a
profit equal to at least 4¢ per pound and retains of 6¢ per
pound on over 900,000 pounds.

(Findings of Fact 20-26, Conclu-

sions of Law 6) .
I. C. 1.

It is reasonably certain that the Respondents

could have acquired the last. 40,000 poults.
Respondents introduced testimony from Moroni Feed
Company that PCA had called the hatchery and was certain
enough of the delivery of the total 60,000 poults that the
budget sheets were based on that figure, not just 20,000 poults.
(Def's Exh. 30)

The hatchery manager stated that the 40,000

poults would have been delivered.

(Tr. 175-176).

No evidence was introduced to the effect that the Moroni Feed
Company would have been unable to meet its commitment to
deliver the poults as ordered.

The trial court had adequate
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evidence to reasonably conclude that the remaining 40,000 poults
would be delivered as ordered.
I.

C.

2.

The amount of retains or dividends Cox would

have received was not speculative.
Moroni Feed Company is a farmers cooperative on a
very firm financial standing.

As part of its program, it with-

holds a portion.of the proceeds fran the sale of the turkeys and pays it to
the g:rower five years later.

These retains, therefore, represent noney con-

tractually owed the turkey grower by Moroni Feed Company.
155)

(Tr.

The testimony at trial made it clear that the receipt of

these is not speculative.

(Tr. 88-90)

No evidence was intro-

duced that Moroni Feed Company had ever failed to pay the retains
in full on the date promised.

Therefore, the lower court had

sufficient reason to find that Moroni Feed Company would pay
retains or dividends in the instant case.
The evidence of a 10% per year discount rate for
these retains was undisputed.

PCA presented no evidence that

the rate was inappropriate to apply in determining present value.
Jeff Cox had found a buyer willing to purchase his future
retains at a 10% per year discount just before PCA encouraged him
to take his farm off the market.

(Tr. 88-90)

Obviously, those

in the turkey growing industry believed the 10% rate was appropriate.

(Tr. 115-117)

The lower court acted reasonably in

applying the 10% discount formula.
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I.

c.

3.

The evidence supports Plaintiffs' lost

profi~.

cox was an experienced turkey grower who had been
in the business for 11 years.

(Tr. 152)

growth and profits in his business.

He had experienced

(Tr. 152, 15 3)

There is

no evidence that Cox lost money during any year that another
grower made money.

(Some of the losses Cox had incurred were

from his cattle operations.

Tr. 162-166, 219 and 322)

POINT II
RESPONDENTS' BUSINESS HISTORY DOES NOT
PRECLUDE AN AWARD OF DAMAGES.
Appellant argues that the Cox turkey raising operation·had been unsuccessful and that, therefore, they should be
denied special damages.

(Appts 1 Brief 18)

does not support this contention.

The record, however,

There was no evidence as to

what amount that Cox's turkey operation had lost during the
previous four years.

(Tr. 162-166)

The turkey growing business

is cyclical and, hence, profit cannot be shown every year.
157)

(Tr.

If Cox had done poorly during the previous four years, it

was because the industry did poorly those years.

(Tr. 219, 322)

There is no evidence that other growers made a profit during
these years.

The record indicates that Cox's business had been

successful in the past.

(Tr. 152, 153)

PCA offered no credible

evidence to indicate that the Cox operation would not have
realized the profits found by the court in 1977.

There was no

dispute but that the profitability of the turkey business is
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-isPOINT III
APPELLANT'S LOAN COMMITMENT IS NOT VOID
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
According to the evidence, the loan committed to
Cox was to be paid back to PCA approximately one year later.
(Tr. 128, 249, 271 A-271)

It is well settled in Utah that if

performance on an oral contract could be performed within one
year, the contract is outside the statute of frauds.

Christen-

sen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959); see
Keith Gas Co.

1

Inc. v. Jackson Creek cattle Co.

I

91 N.M. 87, 570 P.2d 918 (1977)

Howarth v. First National Bank of Anchorage,

540 P.2d 486

(Alaska 1975), aff'd 551 P.2d 934 (1975); see generally 72
Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §9 (1974).

Obviously, Respon-

dents could have repaid the loan within one year.

Indeed, they

would have been required to repay the lo.an no later than one
year after receipt of the money.

Even if there was no agreement

as to the repayment date, the loan still could have been repaid
within one year.
Statute of Frauds.

Such oral contracts are not

affected by the

The fact that the parties had discussed a

government guaranteed loan which would have spread the old
balance over seven years does not invoke the statute of frauds.
In the past the loans had been for one year only.

(Tr. 26)

PCA's commitment was not contingent upon obtaining a government
guaranteed loan.

.(Tr. 96)

Also, the doctrine of promissory estoppel takes
Appellant's oral commitment outside the Statute of Frauds.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

See

i

-16-

Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953); Annot.,
56 A.L.R. 3d 1037, 1050 (1974).

Section 217A of the Retate-

ment (2d) of Contracts lists the elements of promissory
estoppel as follows:

(l) a promise; (2) which the promiser

should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance on
the part of the promisee; ( 3) and which does induce such action
or forebearance, is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of
frauds; ( 4) if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise.
The trial court found a promise or commitment on the
part of Appellant.

(Findings of Fact 17)

Based on this promise,

Respondents took -their farm and retains off the market, ordered
60,000 poults, took delivery of 20,000 poults and started up hls
turkey operation.

(Findings of Fact 19)

Appellant knew his

promise to loan the money induced Respond~nt' s
ings of Fact 20)

actions.

(Find·

Injustice in this case can be avoided only by

enforcement of Appellant's commitment.
Even if the agreement had been for more than one ye
therefore, Appellant PCA would be estopped from asserting the
Statute of Frauds as a defense.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S LOAN OFFICER HAD APPARENT
AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE THE LOAN.
In Malia v. Giles, Utah, 114 P.2d 208 (1941), the
Utah Supreme Court outlined the law of apparent authority:
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. . . Either by action or by inaction where there
is a duty to act, the principal may create a
situation the reasonable interpretation of which,
by a third party with whom the agent is about to
deal, is such as to lead that third party to
believe that the agent has authority to deal with
him as contemplated. Under such· circumstances
the law will hold the principal responsible to that
third party for the results of that deal with the
agent. But the conduct of the principal must be
such as occurs prior to the deal, and not subsequent thereto . . . . (Emphasis added) Malia v.
Giles, supra, at 211.
The Restatement (2d) of Agency, §27, Comment, explains:
. . . Third persons who are aware of what a continuously employed agent has done are normally entitled
to believe that he will continue to have such
authority for at least a limited period in the future,
and this apparent authority continues until the third
person has been notified or learns fact which should
· lead him to believe that the agent is no longer
authorized.
(Emphasis added)
The trial court's finding that the loan officer had
apparent authority is supported by the evidence.
Fact 18)

(Findings of

First, Cox was not aware that the loan officer had no

authority to commit the loan.
ment was final.

He reasonably thought his commit-

(Tr. 117-120)

Second, it was Cox's past experi-

ence that the loan officer alone approved the loan.
120)

(Tr. 117-

Third, PCA was aware of its agents' practices of committ-

ing loans before final approval.
may have informed

its

agents of

(Tr. 252, 308, 322)
a

PCA

policy against committing

loans without the loan board's approval, but
it never gave its customers notice of this procedure.

As far as

Cox was concerned, the loan officer had authority to commit loans.
Thus, Cox has satisfied the Malia requirements of
apparent authority.

PCA failed to act when it had a duty to
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do so and is, therefore, responsible to Respondents Cox for its
agent's promise.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF ADEQUATELY PROVED NET PROFITS
AS PART OF THEIR DAMAGES.
PCA claims that in arriving at net profits, Cox
failed to show how much was realized from the sale of the 20,000
turkeys, how much was spent on fuel, real estate, taxes, rent
and interest.

(Applt's Brief at 19-20)
A.

Sale of turkeys.

When the 20,000 turkeys were taken over by Chad
Blackham, he did so by assuming the poult and feed bill at Moroni
Feed Company.
(Tr. 107)

In addition, Cox received 2 0¢ per poul t

for broodin

At this point about 17, 000 to 18, 000 birds had survived.

(Tr. 107) Cox would have, therefore, received a maximum_ of $3,600.00.
Some of this money was used to pay the Bank of Ephraim who had
loaned $2,500.00 toward the turkey operation and the balance was
applied toward obligations at Moroni Feed Company.

(Tr. 107)

As to the expenses not advanced by Moroni Feed Company, Cox's
evidence showed these separately.

(Tr. 109, 111-112)

B. Fuel exEense.
PCA claims that only the fuel expense for heat to
the turkey poults was included to reach net profits and that
gasoline for trucks was omitted.

(Applt's Brief at 19)

This

argument
isS.J.apparently
based
upon
Jeff
Cox's
testimonv
when he
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Ldentified the expenses which were advanced by Moroni Feed
::ompany on its 70-30 financing program.
~¢

Because the profit of

a pound given by the Moroni Feed Company accountant was net

jf expenses advanced by the cooperative, it was necessary to
identify these types of expenses so they would not be deducted
again from the 4¢ per pound figure.

In identifying such

advanced items advanced by the cooperative, Mr. Cox included
~~!

"the fuel.

And when I say fuel, this would be coal or propane,

l~I:

whatever it takes to brood those turkeys. "
PCA

(Tr. 111)

claims, therefore, that gasoline for trucks

was not deducted.

What gasoline expense is meant is vague.

The evidence showed that the turkeys are trucked by the coopera~l!(

tive, not the grower.

u

if l ;

(Tr. 107)

station.

It would appear, therefore, that truck expense

as used by Mr. Cox refers to the actual expense of owning the
truck (depreciation) •

h0~ th'

He would not have been able to save

is by selling his turkeys.

anci

1

l~ii

ox i

•

l.S

small.

The amount involved in any event

Page 10 of Exhibit 30 lists fann, auto and truck

expense at $500.00.

1

c.

Real estate taxes and EaJ:ments.

PCA admits that real estate payments and taxes
were incurred despite Cox's efforts to minimize his damages.

neat (Applt's Brief at 19)

ha:

Moreover, the evidence indicates

that gasoline was advanced by the cooperative through its service

idr:
H~

(Tr. 186)

These were

obviously fixed expenses.

For this reason, the court did not take them into account--ei ther

~j) for or against either PCA or Cox.

Frankly, counsel for Respondents
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court to consider these. taxes. for any purpose.
D.

Rent.

PCA claims that Exhibit 30, page l, shows a

projecte~

--

expense that was not deducted from Cox's profits to arrive at a net
figure.

(Applt's Brief at 20)

sentence.

This argument. is made in one

There was no evidence, however, to establish that

Cox actually would have incurred this expense in connection
with his turkey operation had PCA honored its commitment.

It

was, therefore, not proper for the lower court to deduct it.
PCA has not been prejudiced in any event.

The trial

court did deduct a $500.00 expense in arriving at a net figure.
(Tr. ·330)
30.

(Id.)

In doing so, the court referred td page l of Exhibit
On that page there are two $500.00 items listed--one

for rent, the other for insurance.

Cox would have incurred the

insurance cost on his turkey raising facilities whether he was
using them or whether they were leased out.

(The coops were

leased out after he sold out and the rental income was deducted
from his offset.

Tr. 331)

There was no evidence that Cox was

able to save the other $500.00 either.

Nevertheless, the trial

court did deduct one $500.00 amount from the offset.
E.

Interest.

PCA claims that the trial court erred when only a
$9,000.00 credit was given as a deduction against Cox's offset
for interest he would have paid if the loan commitment had been
honored.
Cox presented evidence at trial to show that PCA's
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~on

of the loan to be $9, 000. 00.

(Exh. 30, p. 15)

No rebutting

vidence was furnished by PCA.
Moreover, the figure PCA has stated to be the amount
f the loan was $368,100.00.

s incorrect.

oan .

(Applt's Brief at 20)

This figure

PCA's reference to $368,100.00 does not refer to the

(Tr . 12 4 )
Q.
(By Mr. Boyce] And it would be a fair statement; would it not, to say that the bottom line on
that, which in the case is what?

A.

Well, its--

What's tile amount of the bottom line, three
hundred and seventy-one--

Q.

A.

$368,100,0..0.

i..

,.~his figure does not represent the amount of the loan but rather
i•'
':he Estimated Operating Expenses.
(Exh. 30, p. 1) It was well
I~

~stablished

at trial that the cooperative advanced the feed and

11

··,ther items.

The estimated amount of the feed alone was $288,000.00

llC':

·· '(Exh. 30, p.

1)

Even if this feed were paid for by PCA, it would

, w~

· iot have been paid for until it had been acquired.

It would not

:;:1ave been necessary to acquire most of the feed until late in
1977 when all 60,000 turkeys had been obtained and they were of
i

size to require a lot of feed.

"'
~lave

~

Thus, most of the loan would

been for only a fraction of a year.
Had the interest offset been other than $9,000.00,

i ;1PCA should have presented evidence that its own loan officer's

estimate of the interest was inaccurate.
In any event, PCA has suffered no prejudice.

First,
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the court did not take into consideration the fact that the type
of turkey raised by Cox would have yielded a profit after feed
and other cooperative advanced expenses were deducted of between
2¢ and 13¢ more per pound than the 4¢ average.

On 900, 000 pounds,

this would be between $18,000.00 and $117,000.00.

(Tr. 200-204)

second, the trial court added an additional $1,ooo.o'
worth of expense to be deducted from Cox's offset as miscellaneow
expense.

It is not known whether $1,000.00 in miscellaneous

expenses would have ever been incurred.
POINT VI
ATTORNEYS' FEES CANNOT BE ALLOWED
Plaintiff raises on appeal the question of attorneys'
fees.

The parties stipulated at trial that counsel for Defendant

would testify that Plaintiff had incurred $15, 000. 00 as attorneys'
fees in the prosecution and defense of the case.

Plaintiff

clai~

that its attorneys' fee should be reduced only by the same ratio
that the counterclaim offsets against the complaint.
tiff argues, it should be awarded $10,988.50.

Thus, Plain·

(Defendants did

not stipulate that $15,000.00 was a reasonable amount).
In support of its position that the attorneys' fees
should only be reduced by the same ratio as its judgment bears
to the offset, Plaintiff cites several cases Utah.

none of them from

There is a Utah case on point.
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In Stubbs v. Henunert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977) the
Utah Supreme Court, in a foreclosure action held that the trial
court had properly awarded plaintiff its fees for the foreclosure
(3-3/8 hours) and that because the remainder of the attorney
time involved defense of the Counterclaim, the lower court had
correctly ruled that Plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement
for that portion of the fee.
Similarly in the instant case, the vast bulk of the
legal fees would have been incurred with respect to the Counterclaim.

Plaintiff presented no testimony which would enable the

Court to determine how much time was incurred on the Complaint
portion of the case.

The Court had no choice but to deny

attorneys' fees.
Moreover, attorneys' fees are in the sound discretion of the trial court.

In the instant case, it is evident

that in all probability, but for Plaintiff's breach, there would
have been no foreclosure (an interested buyer for Defendants'
farm had been found).

It would be inequitable, therefore, to

award attorneys' fees to Plaintiff.
POINT VII
REBUTAL TO APPELLANT'S CONCLUSION
Appellant's conclusion portion to its brief contains some new arguments.

For this reason the arguments are·

responded to as follows:
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1.

PCA claims Cox should have sought a loan else-

where in order to minimize his damages despite the fact that
each day Cox delayed in selling out he would have continued to
incur very large obligations.
not give Cox this option.

(See Exh. 30 page 1)

He was told he

PCA did

c.ould shut the heat

off and let the poults die; PCA was foreclosing within a week.
2.

PCA claims that no authority existed to make

the loan by the loan officer.

This argument is inconsistent

the course of dealing and course of conduct of the parties.

wi~

There

is no evidence that Cox knew or should have known that the loan
officer was not authorized.

On the other hand, the fact that a

commitment was made is undisputed on appeal.
3.
by the parties.

PCA claims that profits
This is absurd.

were not contemplated

Both parties knew that the

purpose of the turkey operation was the expectation of the profit.
4.

PCA claims the agreement was not performable

within one year, despite the fact that it had previously made
all of its loans to Cox on a one year renewal.
5.

PCA claims that Cox did not prove he was an

average grower or that he would have earned an average profit.
Cox submits that based upon the turkeys he had, he would have
earned a greater than average profit ~ as much as 2 to 13 cents
per pound more.
6.

PCA claims that there was no history of profit

and that damages were speculative.

This fails to take into
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-25account the fact that Cox had made a profit in some years, but
that during the time he financed with PCA the market was
depressed.

The offset is not speculative, however, because

1977 was a very profitable year.
POINT VII

(Continued)

PCA'S CLAIMED REDUCTIONS
1.

PCA claims the counterclaim should be reduced

by $800.00 but does not state how it calculated this amount.

stopped working with the turkeys the first of April, 1977.

Cox
It

was not necessary for him to work with the turkeys in December.
For this reason no living expense was allocated to him as a
living expense on the operating expense schedule made out by PCA
(Exh. 3 0 , p . 1)

The first of April was a Friday so Cox would

ii

have started at the Coal Company on Monday April 4.

wi

have given Cox 36 work weeks plus three days if holidays were

01

not considered.

The Court found 36 weeks even.

error in the calculation (36x200
2.

There was no

= $7,200.00)

PCA claims the remaining 40,000 poults could

not have been obtained.
conclusion.

This would

There is no evidence to support his

The hatching manager testified as follows:
Q. Were you able to accommodate Mr. Cox with
respect to the requests on the initial 20,000?
A.

Yes, we were.

Q. Would you have been able to accommodate him
with respect to the remaining 40,000?
A.

Yes, we probably could.
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3.

PCA claims that the payment of the retains

dividend by Moroni Feed Company in 1982 would have been uncertain and, therefore, speculative.

PCA, however, failed to intro-

duce any evidence to the effect that the cooperative had ever
failed to timely pay "retains" to a grower during its entire
history, or to show any other reasonable ground to question payment.
4.

PCA.claims that all of the expenses were not

deducted to arrive at a net figure.

PCA failed, however, to

show one single expense which would have been incurred, which
had not

otherwise been deducted or which was not saved when

Cox mitigated by selling out.
5.

PCA claims that an award of $4,000.00 toward

the offset as prejudgment interest was improper.

This award

only prevented PCA from charging interest on the amount of the
offset for the year 1978 - after the 1977 profits would have
been realized if PCA had honored its commitments.
CONCLUSION
The fact that PCA breached a commitment to Cox to
finance his turkey operation for 1977 after inducing him to
remove his farm properties and Moroni Feed Company retains from
the market is not disputed on appeal.

Appellant PCA should,

therefore, not be afforded the advantage and benefit of compelling
Respondents Cox to prove damages beyond a reasonable certainty.
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Respondents Cox have presented credible evidence to establish
each element of their damages.

Appellant PCA has failed to meet

its burden of appeal and the court below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

~J
arl Ja
c
NIELSEN,
NRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorne
for Defendants-Respondents
Cox
400 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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